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This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee 
schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. 
Based on theory, the authors discuss different 
organizational features of credit guarantee schemes 
and their variation across countries. They focus on the 
respective role of government and the private sector and 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, Development Research Group, and Latin America and 
Caribbean Region, Finance and Private Sector Development Department—is part of a larger effort in the departments to 
study SME finance. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at lklapper@worldbank.org.  
different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they 
are correlated across countries. The findings show that 
government has an important role to play in funding and 
management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery. 
There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and 
limited use of risk management mechanisms. 
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During the last decade, due to the combination of a generally stable macroeconomic 
environment, global liquidity, and better banking practices and technology across the 
globe, domestic credit to the private sector has been growing in most developing 
countries at rates higher than gross domestic product (GDP).  However, there is anecdotal 
and increasingly statistical evidence that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have not 
benefited from this financial deepening to the same extent as other borrower groups, most 
prominently consumers.   
A recent literature has shown that SMEs not only report higher financing 
obstacles than large firms, but the effect of these financing constraints is stronger for 
SMEs than for large firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck et al., 
2006; see Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006 for an overview).  While the size of the SME 
sector does not seem to have a causal impact on growth, an economy depends on new and 
innovative enterprises, which are more often than not small (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 
2006).  These two observations have led policy makers to focus on policies and 
institutions that help alleviate SMEs’ financing constraints.   
Both high transaction costs related to relationship lending and the high risk 
intrinsic to SME lending explain the reluctance of financial institutions to reach out to 
SMEs (Beck and de la Torre, 2007).  The high churn rate among SMEs results in a high 
default probability.
1 In addition, it is often difficult for banks to conduct risk assessments, 
since data might be sparse and of limited reliability as SMEs’ financial statements are 
generally not audited.  Weak credit information systems – which often exclude the 
smallest firms in developing countries – make it even more difficult to collect historical 
credit information on firms.  Furthermore, the net losses once default takes place are high 
as in many emerging markets weaknesses in collateral registration, contract enforcement, 
bankruptcy codes, and the judicial process and collection mechanisms limit the ability for 
banks to recover assets of the enterprise.  The limited liability structure of most SMEs 
also prevents the lender from having recourse to the assets of the owners.  Directed credit 
                                                 
1 However, there is also evidence that the tail risk is lower for SME loans than for loans to large enterprises 
(Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe, 2006). 
  1programs and credit subsidies with the aim to alleviate SMEs’ financing constraints have 
rarely had the expected success, due to mis-targeting, rent-seeking and lack of fiscal 
sustainability (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Zia, 2008).   
Many countries around the world have therefore made Partial Credit Guarantee 
(PCG) funds a central part of their strategy to alleviate SMEs financing constraints. 
Multi- and bilateral donors have supported the set-up of such schemes around the 
developing world.  These schemes seek to expand lending to SMEs, sometimes focusing 
on specific regions or sectors through reducing lending risk for banks or other financial 
institutions. Specifically, a PCG fund is a risk transfer and risk diversification 
mechanism; it lowers the risk to the lender by substituting part of the risk of the 
counterparty by that of the issuer of the PCG (the fund), which guarantees repayment of 
part of the loan upon a default event.  A PCG fund can also help diversify risk by 
guaranteeing loans across different sectors or geographic areas.  Furthermore, there can 
be informational gains if the guarantor has better information about the borrower than the 
lender. 
Partial (and full) credit guarantee funds have existed at least since the beginning 
of the 20
th century and have become more popular over the past decades.
 Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2008) report that banks see partial credit guarantee 
schemes as the most common and most effective government support program for SME 
lending, ahead of directed credit and interest rate or regulatory subsidies.  In spite of their 
recent growth and initial evidence suggesting success of some of these funds, there is a 
dearth of analysis to systematically inform the process of design of PCG funds, pricing of 
their guarantees, their regulation, and the implication that PCG fund characteristics have 
with respect to the prudential regulation of banking portfolios covered by such 
guarantees.   
This paper is a first effort to provide evidence on the variety of partial credit 
guarantee funds across the world.
2  Specifically, based on a recent survey of PCG funds 
                                                 
2 There are a few surveys of partial credit guarantee schemes, such as Gudger (1998) and Green (2003), but 
none provides the same wealth of quantitative information as our database. 
  2we provide evidence on the variety of different schemes around the globe.
3  The survey 
collects general questions on the characteristics of the fund (ownership, type, etc.), as 
well as detailed information on operational characteristics, such as eligibility, pricing 
structures, etc.  Information is also collected on the size of the PCG’s activities, such as 
the number of loans guaranteed, the number of loan defaults, etc. 
The purpose of this study is to broadly review PCG “typologies” around the 
world.  We find that while many countries have such schemes, their ownership, 
management and funding structures vary widely. We find an important role of 
government in the funding and management of PCG funds, but less so in risk assessment 
and recovery, roles that are mostly confined to the private sector.  Similarly, there is a 
variety of specialization among PCG funds; while most are restricted, some are restricted 
to small enterprises, other are limited to specific regions or sectors, with some funds 
facing multiple restrictions. Similarly, pricing, risk assessment and risk management 
strategies differ across the different schemes. While some schemes focus on loan-level 
guarantees, others guarantee loan portfolios.  There is a surprising dearth of schemes that 
reduce risk through risk-adjusted and performance based pricing and payout only after 
the lender starts legal action against a defaulting borrower.  Finally, we find that the role 
of government in risk assessment, as observed in a few PCG funds, is associated with 
higher loan default rates, while many other PCG characteristics are not.  PCG funds that 
do not use risk management tools as well as older PCG funds also have higher default 
rates, indicating that losses accumulate at a later stage after the set-up of such a scheme, a 
feature that makes such funds attractive for politicians.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a short 
overview over theoretical aspects of PCG funds and organizational characteristics and 
pricing tools that are important to analyze and compare across countries.  Section 3 
discusses the variety of different schemes around the world.  Section 4 focuses on the 
roles of government and the private sector in funding, management and governance of 
PCG funds, while section 5 compares pricing and risk management tools across the 
                                                 
3 The complete survey is available in Appendix 2.  The database itself is available on the web at: 
econ.worldbank.org/programs/finance. 
  3globe.  Section 6 analyzes the variation of loan defaults with different organizational 
characteristics and pricing mechanisms and section 7 concludes and points to future 
research. 
2.  Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes – What Does Theory Tell Us? 
To motivate our empirical analysis of credit guarantee schemes around the world, we 
discuss the theoretical underpinnings for their existence as well design issues.  
Throughout this section, we will draw parallels with another popular financial sector 
policy, deposit insurance schemes. 
2.1  The Reasons for the Emergence of Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes 
As discussed by Honohan (2008), credit guarantee schemes can emerge for three main 
reasons.  First, informational advantages of the guarantor over the lender can help 
overcome information asymmetries and improve access to and/or reduce costs of 
borrowing of financing for certain borrower groups. Requiring guarantors for new 
borrowers was one of the pillars for the success of the cooperative banking movement in 
Germany and other European countries in the 19
th century (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). 
Second, guarantee schemes can help diversify risk across lenders with different sectoral 
or geographic specialization. Cooperative central banks, as created in several European 
countries, serve to insure individual cooperatives heavily invested in specific regions or 
sectors. Third, guarantee schemes can emerge to exploit regulatory arbitrage if the 
guarantor is not subject to the same regulatory requirements as the lender. The recent 
growth in guarantee schemes in China might be due to such regulatory arbitrage 
(Honohan, 2008).  None of these three reasons imply government involvement, and they 
alone can explain the existence of many privately funded and managed credit guarantee 
schemes around the globe.  However, as we will discuss in section 4, government is 
involved in many credit guarantee schemes around the world, be it in the funding, 
management or even credit assessment and recovery of loans.   
This raises the question of the rationale of government involvement or socio-
political reasons for government involvement.  Coordination failure among private 
parties and first mover disadvantage could prevent private providers from entering the 
  4market for credit guarantees or prevent lenders to pool resources for such a scheme and 
thus justify government intervention (De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler, 2008).  
Subsidies for such a scheme, however, especially if they go beyond set-up costs, would 
have to appeal to either distributional arguments or externalities that stem from the 
additional entrepreneurial activities financed by such a guarantee scheme.  
Public choice theory points to political reasons for government support for partial 
credit guarantee schemes.  First, theory shows that PCG funds are more effective and less 
costly in expanding access to external finance than directed lending (Arping, Loranth and 
Morrison, 2008).  Second, unlike directed credit and other intervention mechanisms, PCG 
funds have the resemblance of market-friendly instruments, as the lending decision 
mostly stays with the (private) lender. However, even if the lending decision stays with 
private parties, government support might still be distorting due to other criteria, such as 
sectoral or geographic restrictions. Third, there is little initial cost of funding, with 
potential liabilities due to insurance events much further down the line. There is quite a 
resemblance with deposit insurance schemes along these lines.   Deposit insurance is 
designed to foster depositors’ trust in the financial system. While there is no direct 
influence on lending decisions, deposit insurance schemes can give incentives to 
aggressive risk taking, if not designed properly and in weak institutional environments 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002).  Finally, the initial cost is low, with potential liabilities 
only incurred in the case of a large bank failure or a systemic crisis.  
2.2  The Features of Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes 
To better understand the implications of the different features of PCG funds and their 
guarantee product, we will continue to draw a parallel between deposit insurance and 
partial credit guarantee schemes.  Both face the trade-off between the public policy goal 
of financial stability (deposit insurance schemes) and expanding access to credit (partial 
credit guarantee schemes), on the one hand, and the moral hazard risk of excessive risk 
taking by banks, on the other hand.  The deposit insurance literature has pointed to 
several mechanisms to alleviate the moral hazard risk of such schemes (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Kane, 2002, for an overview).  First, private management and funding, especially if 
provided by the beneficiary banks themselves, can align interests of risk-decision taking 
  5banks and the ultimate owner of deposit insurance schemes, tax payers. Second, coverage 
limits and co-insurance can help instill market discipline by creating a depositor/creditor 
group that is excluded from the benefits of deposit insurance.  Are there parallels to 
partial credit guarantee schemes?  
The assignment of responsibilities among government, private sector and donors 
might be important for the incentives of lenders in screening borrowers properly. Funding 
of the scheme through proper pricing of the guarantees and limiting government funding 
to set-up costs might be important in giving the lenders the proper incentives to monitor 
borrowers, avoid excessive risk taking and thus minimize loan losses.  Credit risk 
assessment by private parties rather than government bureaucrats can help improve the 
quality of these risk decisions and again minimize loan losses.  Similarly, loan recovery 
by lenders rather than the government can maximize recovery as the lender has typically 
more information about the borrower and potentially stronger incentives to recover loan 
resources.  This takes us directly to the question of whether a scheme should assess and 
guarantee individual loans or rather portfolios.  The first approach might reduce the risk, 
but can be very costly.  The critical question is whether the staff of the guarantee scheme 
(or members in the case of mutual guarantee associations) have any advantage in 
assessing the risk of individual loans.  When guaranteeing portfolios rather than 
individual loans, however, other risk management mechanisms have to be in place to 
guarantee a certain minimum quality of the guaranteed loans.  Performance-based pricing 
seems one possibility, with premiums or coverage ratios based on past portfolio 
performance of the respective institution (Cowan, Drexler and Yañez, 2008).  
The coverage ratio can be an important instrument of risk minimization. Retaining 
part of the risk with the lender can increase her incentives to properly assess and monitor 
borrowers and thus reduce loan losses.  Too low a coverage ratio, on the other hand, 
might reduce the value of the guarantee and dampen take-up.  However, the impact of the 
coverage ratio on incentives might vary with the informational advantage.  If the 
guarantor has an informational advantage over the lender, a higher coverage ratio might 
be sustainable than if the informational advantage lies with the lender.  
  6Another question is whether schemes should be targeted on specific sectors or be 
rather broad. Targeting specific sectors or geographic areas might be in the interest of 
policy makers that want to focus the fund on alleviating financing constraints of specific 
disadvantaged groups and thus maximize the additionality of such a scheme.  Too 
specific targeting, on the other hand, might increase the bureaucratic costs of running 
such a fund – e.g. verification costs – and again limit take-up.  Further, such restrictions 
might distort the lending market and lead to net weigh losses (Zia, 2008).  
This paper does not test whether these different characteristics discussed so far are 
related to the performance of credit guarantee schemes, as our aggregate cross-sectional 
data do not allow us to do so.  Rather, using survey results for 46 developed and 
developing countries, we will show the variation in 76 PCG funds around the world.  We 
will provide descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to see how these different 
mechanisms and features vary across countries and are linked with each other in a 
systematic way.  We will focus on two areas – the role of government in partial credit 
schemes and the role of different mechanisms to reduce risks.  Finally, we will provide 
some indication of how loan losses vary across schemes with different characteristics.  
3.  The Sample and Some General Characteristics 
While sections 4 and 5 focus on two specific dimensions along which partial credit 
guarantee schemes differ across countries, this section provides some general information 
about the survey on which our analysis is based, and the sample of PCG funds on which 
we have information.  
Our sample includes 76 PCG funds across 46 countries, both developing and 
developed economies.  Specifically, we have information on PCG funds in 20 high-
income, 25 middle-income, and 1 low-income country (India).  In terms of regional 
distribution among developing countries, we have information on six schemes in Asia, 24 
in Latin America, 11 in transition economies and one in Africa (Egypt).
4  In general, we 
include all national PCG funds if a country has more than one fund; this sometimes 
includes both publicly and privately operated funds (e.g. Argentina), in other cases – such 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 3 for the complete list of countries and funds. 
  7as in the case of Italy- we include multiple public funds with different objectives, i.e. 
SMEs, priority sectors, etc.  In some countries with large numbers of similar regional 
PCG funds, we include a “representative” regional fund, as in the cases of Italy and 
Mexico. 
We obtained the information on the PCGs from a detailed questionnaire that we 
sent to all PCGs for which we could find public contact information. While we sent this 
questionnaire to more than 60 countries, we received responses from PCG funds in 46 
countries.  The survey responses were cleaned and double checked for consistency, with 
detailed follow-up with the respective fund management where necessary.  Appendix 2 
includes the questionnaire.   
Partial credit schemes around the world differ along some basic characteristics in 
systematic ways (Table 1).  While the median age across all schemes is 15, it is 27 in 
high-income, but only 13 years in developing countries. For example, the Small Business 
Association in the United States was created in 1953, while the credit guarantee fund in 
Moldova was established in 2005.  As shown in Figure 1, most PCGs in our sample were 
established after 1990, with a surge of new schemes occurring in the past four years. The 
younger age of schemes in the developing world is driven by schemes in transition and 
Latin American economies, while schemes in Asian countries are almost as old as 
schemes in developed economies (23 years). The high median age in Asia, however, is 
dominated by the two large technology oriented PCGs in Korea.     
In terms of total outstanding loan guarantees, schemes in high-income are almost 
three times as large as schemes in developing countries; if outstanding guarantees are 
measured relative to GDP, however, schemes in developing countries are larger, with a 
median of 0.30% of GDP as compared to 0.21% in developed countries.
5  The region 
with by far the largest schemes is Asia, where the median size is almost 5% of GDP. 
Behind that seemingly low median, however, is a large cross-scheme variation, ranging 
from very small schemes in Italy (of which there are many in this country), to the Korean 
scheme whose outstanding loan guarantees amount to over 9% of GDP, or almost 10% of 
                                                 
5 Please note that these statistics are based only on 27 schemes that reported these data.  
  8total banking credit to the private sector.   In terms of the number of employees, schemes 
in developing countries are somewhat larger than in developed economies; the outlier 
again is Asia, with a median size of 179 employees. 
Table 1:  Summary statistics, medians 














All schemes  76 15  3,700  0.61  18 
By Income          
  High  34  27  909  0.21  15 
  Middle/Low  42  13  360  0.30  21 
By Region          
  Asia  6  23  41,143  4.7  179 
  Latin America  24  11  682  0.06  11 
  Transition  11  14  149  0.35  25 
There is important variation in the degree to which schemes are profit-oriented 
and subject to taxation. 40% of the schemes are for-profit, while the remaining 60% are 
non-profit; 52% are subject to corporate income tax, while 48% have tax-exempt status. 
The likelihood that a scheme is taxable does not vary across income levels of countries. 
In the East Asian and Pacific region, schemes are more likely to be tax-exempt than in 
other regions.  Non-profit oriented PCG funds are typically tax-exempt. 





<1970 1970‐1979 1980‐1989 1990‐2000 2000‐2006
 
The large majority of PCG funds in our sample were created with specific goals 
and thus have restrictions in terms of the sector, type of business or geographic area 
  9whose loans they can guarantee.  Overall, 95% of the schemes have a target restriction 
(Figure 2); the few unrestricted funds are in Latin America and Italy.  While 30 schemes 
have only one restriction, 42 have more than one.  45% of schemes were established to 
assist SMEs.  Other PCG funds are restricted to specific sectors or new firms. 
Specifically, there are 29 schemes that can guarantee loans only of a specific sector; 
among these, 12 schemes specialize in agriculture or rural businesses.  8% can only 
guarantee loans to new businesses, among those all but one scheme have to focus on new 
businesses in a specific sector.  Some PCGs are established by states or municipalities 
and are only eligible to firms operating in their geographic area.  Overall, 24% of 
schemes can only guarantee loans in a specific geographic area. Finally, some guarantees 
are used to foster specific economic policies (i.e. to promote loans to women or minority 
populations).  When asked whether the guarantee schemes pursue specific economic 
policies, 31 responded affirmative, among them even schemes that are funded and 
managed privately. 















A smaller number of PCGs responded to questions on the number of businesses 
assisted and jobs created.
6  For example, PCGs in India, Hungary, and France guaranteed 
loans to over 20,000 businesses in 2006, while in the same year, Funds in Turkey, 
Estonia, El Salvador (and others) assisted fewer than 150.  For example, the 100% 
government-funded and -operated PCG fund in Brazil has guaranteed loans to less than 
100 firms.  In comparison, the privately funded and managed PCG fund in Brazil claims 
                                                 
6 We would like to caution that this information is self-reported. 
  10to have created over 3,000 jobs at 350 new firms.  In addition, in 2006, a PCG fund in 
Spain reports creating over 8,500 jobs, while the Canadian PCG reports fund that it 
assisted the creation of over 18,000 jobs in about 10,000 firms.  Overall, it appears that 
PCG funds guarantee loans at small firms (with less than 10 employees).  However, this 
‘impact’ data is only meaningful relative to the cost per loan, business, and employee, 
which firms were unwilling to report (as proprietary data) and is therefore (unfortunately) 
beyond the scope of this paper.
7   
These basic characteristics we have been discussing provide a first glance at 
differences in the way partial credit guarantee schemes operate across countries.  They 
already underline that one size does not fit all.  In the following two sections, we will 
consider in more depth two dimensions that theory suggests are critical to the 
performance of partial credit guarantee schemes, i.e. (i) the ownership and governance 
structure of schemes, as well as the respective roles of government and private sector and 
(ii) the pricing and risk management mechanisms applied by different PCG funds around 
the world. 
4.  Ownership, Governance and Funding of PCGs across the Globe 
The funding, ownership and governance structure of schemes can provide critical 
incentives for lenders and borrowers in how they manage their risk and to which extent 
the scheme has a degree of additionality, as we have already discussed in section 2.   
4.1  Governance of PCGs 
We first consider the corporate structure of schemes. There are three common types of 
corporate governance across the globe:  
(i)  Mutual Guarantee Associations (or Societies) are a collective of independent 
businesses and/or organizations that grant collective guarantees to loans issued to 
their ‘members’, who are involved as shareholders and/or in management of the 
                                                 
7 Several country-level studies have tried a rigorous assessment of impact. Columba, Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2008) find that firms participating in the mutual guarantee schemes pay significantly lower 
interest rates than non-participating firms. Lelarge, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find that the French program 
indeed alleviates credit constraints, with the net effect being positive in spite of higher loan losses from 
participating borrowers. Hancock, Peek and Wilcox (2007) find that guarantees by the Small Business 
Administration in the U.S. had a stabilizing impact on states’ economy, while Wilcox and Yasuda (2007) 
find a positive effect of guarantees during the Japanese crisis.  
  11association.  These associations may include government support.  Examples 
include the partial credit guarantee schemes in Italy (Columba, Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2008). 
(ii)   Publicly Operated National Schemes are government initiatives at the local, 
regional, or national level.  These are generally established as part of a public 
policy towards providing financing to SMEs or some other priority sector or 
demographic group (i.e. women or minorities).  Although publicly funded, these 
might be managed by private groups.  Examples include the credit guarantee 
schemes in Korea (Kang, 2005).  
(iii)  Corporate Associations are established – and generally funded and operated – by 
the private sector.  Examples include guarantee schemes in Greece and Romania.  
As shown in Figure 3, the majority of PCGs in high-income countries are mutual 
guarantee associations, while the majority of funds in middle- and low-income countries 
are publicly operated. There are only five schemes in the sample that have the form of a 
corporate association.
8    













                                                 
8 The numbers do not add up to 76 as we have missing observations for this question.  
  12In addition, we find that publicly operated schemes are on average significantly 
younger than mutually operated funds and significantly more likely to be operating in 
emerging markets, suggesting that this is the guarantee system of choice in the recent 
wave of new PCG funds.  However, this pattern might also reflect a survivor bias, with 
mutually funded schemes being financially more sustainable.   In addition, as will be 
discussed in the next section, we find that publicly operated funds are significantly less 
likely to have private sector participation or market based pricing structures or use any 
ex-post risk management tools. 
4.2  Funding, Ownership, and Management of PCGs  
Next, we take a closer look at the respective roles of government, donors and private 
sector in the funding, ownership and management of partial credit guarantee schemes.  
Specifically, we examine in detail four aspects of the PCG:  First, the funding of PCG 
funds; second, the management of PCG operations; third, the ex-ante credit risk 
assessment of loans; and fourth, the ex-post responsibility of loan recoveries.  In each 
case, we identify the role of (i) government agencies, (ii) central banks and banking 
supervisors (government related agencies), (iii) NGOs and multi-lateral agencies, and 
(iv) the private sector (financial institutions and private companies).  Table 2 summarizes 
the percentage of PCG funds across ownership types (note that columns do not sum to 
100%, i.e. a PCG might receive funding from both government and private sources, and 
we exclude multilateral agencies and business associations), while Table 3 shows the 
correlation among some of the categories and with GDP per capita and financial 
development.   
Table 2:  Responsibilities in PCG funds 
  Funding Management  Credit Risk 
Assessment  Recovery 
Government  49% 17%  11% 8% 
Government-Related  3% 9%  8% 1% 
NGO (e.g. donors)  5% 5%  4% 3% 
Private  58% 51%  57% 55% 
There are several interesting findings in Table 2.  First, central banks and 
supervisory authorities (government-related) have little involvement in the management 
and risk assessment and even less in funding and recovery. Similarly, donors have a 
  13limited role in the different aspects of partial credit guarantee schemes.  Third, while 
governments do have an important role in funding – over a third of schemes rely at least 
partially on government funding – they have a much more limited role in management, 
risk assessment and recovery. Finally, while the private sector shares in funding with 
governments, it is dominant in management, risk assessment and recovery, i.e. the banks 
that are generating the loans being guaranteed are mostly responsible for credit risk 
assessment and recovery of defaulting loans. 
Table 3:  Correlations of responsibilities 
 Funding_G Manage_G CrRisk_G Recovery_G Funding_P Manage_P CrRisk_P 
Manage_G  0.23**            
CrRisk_G  0.05 0.46***           
Recovery_G  0.12 0.47***  0.51***         
Funding_P  -0.02 -0.15  -0.10  -0.21*       
Manage_P  -0.04 -0.18  -0.16 -0.11  0.49***     
CrRisk_P  -0.05 0.19 0.06 0.18  0.00  0.31***  
Recovery_P  -0.03 0.25**  0.19*  0.10  0.10  0.18  0.69*** 
 
Note:  Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. P indicates private, 
while G indicates government or government-related. 
Table 3 shows the correlation among responsibilities.  We find, for example, that 
PCGs with government or government related funding (including government agencies, 
banking supervisors and central banks) are significantly more likely to also have 
government or government related management.  Similar results hold for private funding 
and management.  Interestingly, even funds with government management and credit risk 
assessment responsibilities are significantly more likely to use private parties to recover 
loan losses. 
We also include two indices to measure government and private sector 
‘responsibility’.  The first index measures the government’s role in the PCG, 
Responsibilities-Government; a higher value indicates a smaller role for the private 
sector.  The index is calculated as the sum of four sub-indices for Credit Risk, Funding, 
Management, and Recovery.  Each sub index is equal to three if government agency; two 
if government related (central bank or bank supervisor); one if NGO or bilateral 
organization; and zero otherwise (financial institution or private company; i.e. the 
minimum is zero (if all four categories are private) and the maximum is 12 (if all four 
  14categories are government).  Categories might involve multiple parties – e.g. funding 
might come from private and government sources.  For this variable, any government 
involvement identifies the variable as “government” (equal to three).  The mean value of 
this variable is 3.14, with a minimum value of zero and a maximum of 12.  We also 
construct an analogous variable, Responsibilities-Private, for which any private sector 
involvement identifies the category as private (equal to zero); the average value of this 
variable is 1.69, with a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of nine.  Lower 
values indicate a higher involvement of the private sector in the management and funding 
of PCG funds.   
There are 21 PCG funds with no government involvement at all, while funds in 
Macao and Malta show the highest degree of government involvement. There are 21 PCG 
funds where the private sector is involved in all four areas, funding, management, risk 
assessment and recovery. Overall government involvement is lower in developing than in 
developed economies.  Further, government involvement is especially high in the East 
Asia and Pacific region.   
5.  Risk Management and Pricing 
While we find that risk assessment and recovery are mostly in private hands across 
countries, there is a variety of mechanisms that can be used to reduce risk and maximize 
the additionality of credit guarantee schemes, ranging from guarantee origination over 
pricing to pay-out mechanisms.  
5.1  Guarantee Mechanisms and Coverage Ratios 
First, PCG funds can guarantee loans directly or in the form of counter- or co-guarantees.  
Specifically, the two mechanisms are: 
(i)  Direct guarantees to the bank directly cover outstanding loans; and 
(ii)  Counter-guarantees or co-guarantee with mutual guarantee institutions provide 
indirect protection to the lender through a guarantee of the main guarantor.  This 
might be in the form of a guarantee in the case of default of the main guarantor or 
  15as a percentage of each loss incurred by the main guarantor.  Counter-guarantors 
can be states, public agencies, or international financial institutions. 
For our sample of PCG funds, all but five funds offer only direct guarantees to the 
bank.  Of the five funds that offer counter-guarantees, four are in high-income countries. 
Another important dimension at guarantee origination is whether a scheme 
guarantees individual loans or loan portfolios. Many schemes provide “loan-level” 
guarantees, which generally involve the guarantee agency in the screening stage to not 
only review eligibility (i.e., whether the potential borrower is within the PCG’s target 
group) but also risk profile (i.e., whether the level of credit risk associated with the 
borrower is within adequate limits).  In this approach, a lender will usually first approve a 
loan and then seek a guarantee approval on the borrower’s behalf.  Alternatively, the 
“portfolio” model allows lenders, at their discretion, to assign guarantees to higher risk 
loans or targeted borrowers (i.e. SMEs) and inform the guarantor after the loan is 
approved or the loan defaults.
9  While the loan-level approach might allow for more 
careful screening and risk management, it is also more costly for the credit guarantee 
fund.  We find that 72% of PCGs use a loan or “selective” basis, while 14% use a 
portfolio or “lump screening” approach. 9% use a combination of the two approaches.  
There is no significant difference between high-income and developing countries in the 
extent to which schemes use the loan or the portfolio approach, neither is there a 
significant difference among countries at different levels of financial development. PCG 
funds with no eligibility restrictions are more likely to choose the portfolio approach.  
A related issue is the risk coverage offered by a guarantee agency. Around 40% of 
all schemes in our sample offer guarantees of up to 100%. Given the discussion in section 
2 on incentives for lenders to properly assess and monitor risk, this is a quite surprising 
finding.  While many schemes offer only up to 50% coverage, the median coverage ratio 
is 80%.  There is no significant correlation of economic and financial development with 
the maximum coverage ratio. Further, there is no significant correlation of the coverage 
                                                 
9 For the purpose of our summary statistics, we include an “intermediate” approach – which includes PCGs 
that guarantee a combination of both loan and portfolio mechanisms – in the “portfolio” category, since our 
interest is in identifying PCGs that only guarantee specific loans. 
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association) or with the role of government. Coverage ratios thus do not seem to be set in 
line with informational advantages or incentives structures.  In addition to maximum 
coverage ratios, almost half the schemes in our sample have an absolute maximum 
guarantee amount, this especially holds for schemes that are restricted to guarantee loans 
to small enterprises. 
In addition to maximum coverage, about 40% of PCGs have a maximum 
guarantee period.  This ranges from 3 to 25 years, with a median of 10 years.  About a 
quarter of the PCGs in our sample have restrictions on guarantee limits and periods and 
on eligibility; in other words, some PCGs are designed to more strictly limit their 
guarantees and the resulting risk.  Schemes in economically and financially more 
developed countries are more likely to have maturity restrictions. 
There is also variation in what features of the loan PCGs will cover.  This 
includes the principal, interest, and other costs.  We find that most PCGs guarantee at 
least the loan principal (74%), while fewer guarantee only interest (34%) or other costs 
(13%); almost 30% guarantee both principal and interest. 
Summarizing, there is a wide variation in guarantee mechanisms and coverage 
ratios across countries.  Perhaps most striking, a large proportion of schemes provide 
100% guarantees, certainly not in line with providing incentives for lenders to properly 
assess and monitor borrowers. 
5.2  Pricing and Pay-out of Guarantees  
Appropriate pricing is an important part of a guarantee scheme, both in terms of 
incentives for lenders and borrowers, as well as for the sustainability of the scheme. In 
56% of our sample, the fees are paid directly by the borrower and in 21% by the financial 
institution receiving the guarantee (although this cost might be passed on to the 
customer).  63% of PCGs in our sample (48) have a per-loan fee, while 30% of the 
schemes levy an annual fee; 15% charge a membership fee.  There is also variation in the 
basis that schemes use to compute fees:  57% base the fee on the amount guaranteed, 
while 26% base it on the loan amount.  Further, 25% of the schemes that charge on a per-
  17loan basis take into account the maturity of the guaranteed loan when computing the fee, 
while 25% adapt the fee according to the risk of the loan or the borrower.    Only few 
PCGs use a risk-based pricing structure – in only 7% of PCGs in our sample does success 
in the repayment of loans lower the price of future guarantees, while only 10% impose 
penalty rates for financial institutions with below-average loan performance.   
There is large variation in the time after default that the guarantee fund pays the 
lender. This ranges from very short durations, where the guarantee fund may arrange 
rescheduled payments with borrowers, to longer periods (i.e. 12 months in Germany).  In 
addition, there is variation in whether or not the lender is required to first write-off the 
loan or to initiate legal action, although the latter might be infeasible in many developing 
countries.  In 34% of the schemes in our sample, payouts are made after the borrower 
defaults. In 42% of the schemes, payout happens after the bank initiates recovery, while 
in 3% it happens after the PCG initiates recovery.  In only 14% of all cases, payout has to 
wait until the bank writes off the loan.  Schemes in more developed countries are more 
likely to pay out after default or after write-off, while schemes in developing countries 
are more likely to pay out after the bank initiates legal action. This might be a mechanism 
to reduce moral hazard risk on the side of lenders who might be too quick to write off a 
loan after default, especially with PCG funds with high coverage ratios.   
Summarizing, there is again a large variation across schemes and countries in 
terms of pricing and pay-out mechanisms.  Overall, there seems a dearth of schemes that 
base their pricing on risk calculation and structure pay-out as to maximize incentives for 
lenders to minimize loan losses. 
5.3  Risk Management of PCGs  
Guarantee funds may reduce their own ex-post exposure to loan defaults through 
reinsurance, loan sales, or portfolio securitizations.  Their ability to diversify risk 
depends, however, on the development of local capital markets and financial products. 
There are a number of risk management instruments for diversifying loan portfolio risk, 
including (re)insurance and securitizations.  We find that 20% of PCGs in our sample 
purchase some form of loan insurance and 10% securitize their loan portfolios (about 5% 
  18use both risk management strategies). Overall, 76% of all schemes in our sample use risk 
management tools, while 24% report not using any type of risk management tools to 
manage their risk. 
To gauge the “risk-basedness” of pricing, we compute an index that indicates the 
degree to which pricing and payout enhance risk assessment and monitoring incentives of 
lenders.  The index is calculated as the sum of the following: one if additional penalty 
rates are applicable in the case of default in the payment; one if success in the repayment 
of loans lowers the price of future guarantees; one if the pricing structure of the fees is 
adapted to risk; and one if payout happens after the bank initiates legal action against the 
borrower.  While the theoretical maximum value for this index is four, in reality, the 
index varies between zero and three, with a median of one and an average of 0.8.  
Interestingly, the components do not show a very high correlation among each other, 
suggesting that PCGs see them as substitutes rather than complements.  
Risk pricing does not vary significantly with the level of economic and financial 
development of countries.  Funds that are restricted to small borrowers, however, are 
more likely to have elements in place that base pricing and payouts on risk.  
Table 4 shows a correlation matrix among the operational characteristics of PCG 
funds in our sample.  First, we examine differences between PCG funds that guarantee on 
the loan-level (3) versus PCG funds that guarantee portfolios (4).  We find that PCG 
funds that use a loan-basis approach are significantly more likely to have a guarantee 
limit, presumably as tool to minimize risk exposure.  We also find that PCG funds that 
use a portfolio approach are significantly more likely to receive government funding – 
and use the private sector for credit risk assessment (not shown).   
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Guarantee Limit (1)  1.00               
Principal Coverage  Ratio (%)  (2)  -0.01  1.00             
Operational Mechanism -- Loan 
Basis (3) 
0.25
** -0.01  1.00           
Operational Mechanism – Portfolio 
(4) 
0.05 -0.14 -0.08  1.00         
Loan repayment Lowers Costs of 
Future Guarantees (5) 
0.01  0.23
* 0.05  -0.11  1.00       
Payout – At Time of Default  (6)  -0.17  -0.02  0.01  0.10  -0.56
*** 1.00     
Payout  -- After Bank Initiates 
Recovery (7) 
0.18
* -0.07 -0.01  0.03  -0.30
***  -0.28
** 1.00   
Payout – After Bank Writes off the 
Loan  (8) 
0.05 0.14 0.09  -0.06  -0.01 -0.02 0.08  1.00 
Risk Management – Insurance or 
Portfolio Securitization (9) 
0.16 0.02 0.08  -0.02  0.06 -0.09  0.13  0.19 




Note:  Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Next, we find a significant relationship between repayment performance lowering 
the cost of future fees and higher coverage ratios and later payouts (i.e. a significantly 
lower likelihood of payouts at the time of default or when the bank initiates recovery).  
This indicates that schemes compensate higher coverage ratios with an incentive for 
banks to minimize loan losses, while a later payout of loan losses is complementary to the 
lower future fee incentive for lenders.  We also find that PCGs that pay out at the time of 
default are more likely to have a risk management program, whereas the reverse is true 
for PCGs that pay out later (after the bank initiates recovery or writes off the loan).  In 
other words, it appears that PCG funds that take on more ex-post risk (and recovery 
costs), correct for this by better risk management. 
Finally, we examine the relationship between pricing and risk management 
mechanisms, on the one hand, and government responsibility, on the other hand.  Table 5 
shows the disaggregated indices indicating government responsibility, for funding, credit 
risk, and recovery.  PCG funds with government responsibility for credit risk and 
recovery are older and significantly more likely to guarantee loan portfolios, pay out after 
the bank initiates recovery, and have no risk management program.  These results are 
  20consistent with the general notion that PCG funds with greater government involvement 
are less likely to manage risk and losses. On the other hand, there are few significant 
correlations between government funding and management and operational, pricing and 
risk management mechanisms. 
Summarizing, there is some evidence that more generous schemes compensate 
with better risk management, while funds with government involvement in credit 
decisions and recovery are less likely to manage risks and losses.  Overall, there seems 
much less risk management by PCG funds than one would expect.  
Table 5:  Correlation matrix of government responsibilities 
  Funding_G Manage_G CrRisk_G Recovery_G 
        
Age 0.15  0.15  0.33***  0.26** 
Operational Mechanism – Loan Basis   0.07  0.13  0.04  0.08 
Operational Mechanism – Portfolio   -0.03  0.24**  0.29***  0.23** 
Pricing Structure – Fee Adapted to Risk   0.08  0.13  -0.12  -0.11 
Time of Payout – At Time of Default   0.13  0.26  -0.08  -0.11 
Time of Payout  -- After Bank Initiates Recovery   0.02  -0.10  0.34***  0.25** 
Time of Payout – After Bank Writes off the Loan   -0.18  -0.06  -0.08  -0.07 
Risk Management – Insurance or Portfolio Securitiz.  0.11  0.17  -0.02  -0.01 
Risk Management – None   -0.04  0.00  0.20*  0.20* 
Note:  Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
6.  Explaining Loan Losses with Characteristics of Credit Guarantee Schemes 
How do loan losses covered by PCG funds vary across schemes with different 
characteristics?  To answer this question, we consider the ratio of the number of loans in 
default to total number of loan guaranteed and assess how it varies across schemes with 
different characteristics.
10  We find that this ratio varies greatly, from zero in Honduras 
and Argentina to 36% in the Bahamas. 
                                                 
10 While the ratio of loans requiring payout to total loans guaranteed might be a more adequate measure, 
data on this ratio are available for fewer countries.  
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% of loan 
defaults 
Means  50 117,133.20 85,177.48  5.37% 
 
Guarantee type: 
Loan 32  26,102.53  86,437.54  5.97% 
Portfolio 12  408441.90  **  89,782.00  4.22% 
Ex-post risk management: 
Insurance or securitization  3  133,375.30  7,884.00  18.00% 
None  12 14050.55  * 38,715.50  2.24%** 
Payout: 
After initiation of recovery  23  196,072.30  52,608.05  3.99% 
After write-off  8  34,992.33  55,380.33  11.45% 
After default  16  67,048.38  152,247.20 ***  5.28% 
Responsibility_Private: 
Greater than zero   19  38,612.45  75,759.93  7.75% 
Equal to zero  27  188,354.50  107,043.90  3.56% * 
Note:  Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
We find that default rates are higher in older schemes, which underlines the 
attractiveness of these schemes for politicians, as discussed above.  Loan losses 
accumulate at later stages of the life of a PCG fund, while the initial costs are limited.  As 
shown in Table 6, defaults are higher in schemes that allow pay-out after a bank writes 
off a loan, while they are not higher or lower in schemes which require banks to initiate 
legal actions before payout.  We also find a strong correlation of default with 
government’s role in partial credit guarantee schemes.   
These simple comparisons are confirmed by regressions reported in Table 7. 
Here, we regress the percentage of loan defaults on different characteristics of PCG 
funds.  Given the limited sample size of 37 PCG funds for which we have the necessary 
data, only few of the variables enter significantly and only so at the 10% level.  We find 
that older funds and funds that do not use risk management tools such as reinsurance or 
securitization have higher losses. Similarly, the regression analysis suggests that 
government involvement in credit decisions is associated with higher losses, while 
government involvement in funding, management, and recovery is surprisingly not.  
Furthermore, lower default rates are associated with our overall index of private sector 
responsibility.  It is important to note that these are partial correlations and do not imply 
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the results.  However, these results give us important first insights into what might be 
driving the sustainability of PCG funds across countries.  
It is also interesting to consider insignificant correlations of loan losses.  First, 
there is no significant variation in default rates between countries at different levels of 
economic development.  Second, the size of the PCG funds is not robustly correlated with 
loan losses.  Also, the governance structure, loan vs. portfolio approach and timing of the 
payout are not correlated with the loan losses a PCG fund incurs.  Finally, in unreported 
correlations, we also could not find any correlation of loan losses of PCG funds with the 
degree that funds restrict themselves to specific target groups.  
Table 7: What explains loan losses - multivariate regressions 
Ln GDP per capita  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01 
 [0.92]  [0.61]  [0.32]  [0.37]  [0.66] 
Ln Total Assets  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 [0.58]  [0.18]  [0.10]*  [0.09]*  [0.28] 
Ln Age  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03 
 [0.09]*  [0.08]*  [0.06]*  [0.06]*  [0.18] 
Mutual Guarantee  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
 [0.51]  [0.59]  [0.65]  [0.48]  [0.44] 
No Risk Management  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.06 
 [0.10]  [0.09]*  [0.05]*  [0.06]*  [0.10] 
Loan Basis  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.04 
 [0.93]  [0.64]  [0.41]  [0.74]  [0.26] 
Default Payout   0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 [0.58]  [0.96]  [0.50]  [0.61]  [0.59] 
       -0.02   
Govt Funding  -0.03         
 [0.30]         
Govt Management    0.05       
   [0.25]       
Govt Credit Risk      0.07     
     [0.06]*     
Govt Recovery        0.09   
       [0.18]   
Private Responsibility          -0.06 
         [0.09]* 
Constant -0.13  -0.11  -0.08  -0.05  -0.05 
 [0.36]  [0.46]  [0.56]  [0.75]  [0.72] 
Observations 37  37  37  37  37 
R-squared 0.27  0.31  0.37  0.36  0.35 
Note:  Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  237. Conclusions   
Credit guarantee schemes have become the instrument of choice for policy makers to 
increase access to lending, especially for constrained groups such as small or new 
enterprises.  Little has been known, however, about how these schemes vary across 
countries.  This paper is a first effort to fill this gap. Using a survey of partial credit 
guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries, it provides a first 
overview of how schemes differ in their characteristics.   
We find a large variation in the organizational structure, the role of the 
government and private sector, and the risk management and pricing mechanisms that 
partial credit guarantee schemes use around the world.  However, there is surprisingly 
little systematic variation in many of these characteristics with economic and financial 
development.  
Our survey shows an important role of government in partial credit guarantee 
schemes around the world, but mostly limited to funding and management, and much less 
in credit risk assessment and recovery.  This might be for the better, as we also find that 
where government is involved in credit risk assessment, default rates are typically higher.  
Older schemes are also more likely to be government funded and managed and also have 
higher loan losses, consistent with the notion that the costs and liabilities of a PCG fund 
become obvious only after some time. We find a surprisingly low incidence of risk-based 
pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms. However, there are some 
indications that funds that take on more risk also compensate for this by better risk 
management.  
While this database is an important first step to better understand the typology of 
credit guarantee schemes around the world, there are also clear limitations. Using cross-
country data such as the ones presented here do not allow to properly asses the effect of 
different characteristics of partial credit guarantee schemes on banks’ risk-taking 
decisions and on the effect that credit guarantee schemes have on access to credit, 
entrepreneurship and job creation.  Such assessments would require loan-level data, 
  24preferably over a longer time-period and changes in specific characteristics of guarantee 
schemes.   
Looking forward, we hope that this first overview based on a survey of PCG 
funds motivates more research.  First, more theory is needed to better understand which 
organizational, pricing and risk management features can help maximize the impact of 
PCG funds, while minimizing the risk.  Second, more empirical research on specific 
funds and how they have developed over time can help understand which features have 
worked best in practice.  Such research, however, requires time-series data and preferably 
relies on loan- and borrower-level data.  Finally, more research is needed to do a proper 
cost-benefit analysis of PCG funds compared to other SME government interventions.  
Even if one agrees with the hypothesis that subsidies are justified to foster the access of 
SMEs to external finance, it is still important to understand, which intervention is the 
most cost-effective to do so.  
  25References 
 
Adasme, Osvaldo, Giovanni Majnoni, and Myriam Uribe. 2006. “Access and Risk: 
Friends or Foes? Lessons from Chile.” Policy Research Working Paper 4003, World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
Arping, Stefan, Gyöngyi Loranth and Alan Morrison. 2008. “Public Initiative to Support 
Entrepreneurs: Credit Guarantees vs. Co-Funding.” World Bank mimeo.  
 
Beck, Thorsten, and Augusto de la Torre. 2007. “The Basic Analytics of Access to 
Financial Services.” Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 16(2): 79-117. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., and Maksimovic, V., 2006. The Determinants 
of Financing Obstacles. Journal of International Money and Finance 25, 932-952. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V., 2005. Financial and Legal 
Constraints to Firm Growth: Does Firm Size Matter? Journal of Finance 60, 137-177.  
 
Beck, Thorsten, and Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt. 2006. “Small and Medium-Size Enterprises: 
Access to Finance as a Growth Constraint.” Journal of Banking and Finance 30(11): 
2931-43. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria. 2008. “Banking 
SMEs Around the World: Drivers, Obstacles, Business Models, and Lending Practices” 
World Bank mimeo. 
 
Columba, Francesco, Leonardo Gambacorta and PaoloEmilio Mistrulli. 2008. “Firms as 
Monitors of Other Firms: Mutual Loan Guarantee Consortia and SMEs’ Financing.” 
Banca d’Italia mimeo. 
 
Cowan, Kevin, Alejandro Drexler and Alvaro Yañez, 2007. “The Effect of Partial Credit  
Guarantees on the Credit Market of Small Businesses.”, Banco Central de Chile, mimeo. 
 
De la Torre, Augusto, Juan Carlos Gozzi, and Sergio Schmukler. 2008. “Innovative 
Experiences in Access to Finance: Market Friendly Roles for the Visible Hand?” 
Stanford University Press and the World Bank, forthcoming. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Edward Kane. 2002. “Deposit Insurance Around the Globe?  
Where Does it Work? Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(2): 175-95. 
 
Ghatak, M. and T. Guinnane (1999) “The Economics of  Lending with Joint Liability: 
Theory and Practice”,  Journal of Development  Economics, Vol. 60, pp.195-228, 
 
Green, Anke. 2003. “Credit Guarantee Schemes for Small Enterprises: An Effective 
Instrument to Promote Private Sector-Led Growth?” SME Technical Working Paper No. 
10. Vienna: UNIDO. 
  26Gudger, Michael. 1998. “Credit Guarantees: An Assessment of the State of Knowledge 
and New Avenues of Research.” FAO. 
 
Hancock, Diana, Joe Peek, and James A. Wilcox, 2008. “The Repercussions on Small 
Banks and Small Businesses of Bank Capital and Loan Guarantees.” Mimeo.  
 
Honohan, Patrick.2008. “Partial Credit Guarantees: Principles and Practice.” World Bank 
mimeo.  
 
Kang, Dongsoo. 2005. “Distress of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Role of 
Credit Guarantee Scheme in Restructuring: the Case of Korea.” Korea Development 
Institute mimeo.  
 
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian. 2005. “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected 
Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 120 (4): 1371-411. 
 
Klapper, Leora, Luc Laeven and Raghuram Rajan. 2006. “Entry Regulation as a Barrier 
to Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Financial Economics 82: 591-62 
 
Lelarge, C., Sraer, D and Thesmar, D. 2007 “ Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints 
Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee Program”. INSEE Working Paper. 
 
Wilcox, James and Yukihiro Yasuda, 2008. Do Government Loan Guarantees Lower, or 
Raise, Banks’ Non-Guaranteed Lending? Evidence From Japanese Banks” 
 
Zia, Bilal. 2008. “Export Incentives, Financial Constraints, and the (Mis)Allocation of 
Credit: Micro-Level Evidence from Subsidized Export Loans.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 87.
  27Appendix 1:  Variable definitions and summary statistics 
 
Question numbers correspond to the World Bank PCG Survey in Annex A.  All variables are mean, with the 
exception of PCG age and Total Assets.  All summary statistics include 76 observations, with the exception 
of  Guarantee Coverage (52 observations) and Total Assets (64).  For “q08”, “government” includes 
Government Agencies, Central Bank, and Banking Supervisors; “private” includes Financial Institutions and 
Private Companies (NGOs are Multilateral Agencies are excluded). 
 
Question Variable  Mean 
q01  PCG Age (mean / median)  20.6 / 15.0 
q02  Total Assets  (median, US$ millions)  $ 27.4 
q04  Type of Guarantee System – Mutual Guarantee Association (%)  28.94 
q04  Type of Guarantee System – Publicly Operated National Schemes (%)  31.58 
q05   Profit (versus Non-Profit) (%)  39.39 
q06_1  Type of Guarantee – Direct Guarantee to Banks (%)  78.95 
q06_2 or _3   Type of Guarantee – Mutual (%)  11.84 
q09_1_1 or _2  Eligibility – SMEs (%)  30.26 
q11  Guarantee Limit (%)  57.89 
q13_1  Guarantee Coverage – Principal Coverage Ratio (%)  79.86 
q14_1  Operational Mechanism – Loan Basis/ Selective (%)  72.37 
q14_2  Operational Mechanism – Portfolio / Global Approach (%)  14.47 
q16_3_4  Pricing Structure – Fee Adapted to Risk (%)  21.05 
q18  Does Repayment of Loans Lower the Price of Future Guarantees? (%)  6.58 
q19_1  Time of Payout – At Time of Default (%)  34.21 
q19_2  Time of Payout – After Bank Initiates Recovery (%)  42.11 
q19_4  Time of Payout – After the Bank Writes Off the Loan (%)  14.47 
q20  Collateral – Provided by Borrowers (%)  56.58 
q21  PCG Rejection – Bank Offers Loan for Higher Rate/ Collateral (%)   55.26 
q23_1 or _2  Risk management – (Re)Insurance or Portfolio Securitization (%)  25.00 
q23_3  Risk management – None (%)  23.68 
q_08_Fu_g Funding_Government  48.68 
q_08_Fu_p Funding_Private  48.68 
q_08_Ma_g Management_Government  23.68 
q_08_Ma_p Management_Private  43.42 
q_08_Cr_g Credit  Risk_  Government  17.11 
q_08_Cr_p Credit  Risk_Private  55.26 
q_08_Re_g Recovery_Government  9.21 
q_08_Re_p Recovery_Private  53.95 
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Appendix 1:  Variable definitions and summary statistics (cont.) 
 
 
Question Variable  Mean 
q_responsibility_g  An index indicating the public role in the PCG; a higher value indicates a 
smaller role for the private sector.  The index is calculated as the sum of 
four sub-indices for Credit Risk, Funding, Management, and Recovery.  
Each subindex is equal to three if government agency; two if government 
related (central bank or bank supervisor); one if NGO or bilateral 
organization; and zero if each column gives a three if govt., two if govt-
related, one if non-profit and zero otherwise (financial institution or private 
company.  I.e. the minimum is zero (if all four categories are private) and 
the maximum is 12 (if all four categories are government).   Categories 
might involve multiple parties – e.g. funding might come from private and 
government sources.  For this variable, any government involvement is 
identified as “government”.   
3.15 
q_responsibility_p  For the definition, see “g_responsibility_g”, except for this variable, any 
financial institution or private company involvement is identified as 
“private” (equal to zero). 
1.69 
q_index_default  An index indicating risk based pricing of loan defaults; a higher value 
indicates greater responsibility.  The index is calculated as the sum of 
the following: one if additional penalty rates are not applicable in the 
case of default in the payment (q18 equals “NO”); one if success in the 
repayment of loans lowers the price of future guarantees (q17 equals 
“Yes”); one if the pricing structure of the fees is adapted to risk (q15); 
and one if 18 is if the time of payoff is after bank writes off loan (q19). 
1.32 




Panel A: General Characteristics 
 
1.  Year of beginning of activities:_________________ 
 
2.  Total assets:  ________________________________ 
 
3.  Number of employees: ________ 
 
4.  Type of guarantee system: 
□ Mutual Guarantee Association 
□ Publicly Operated National Schemes 
□ Corporate Association 





5.  Purpose: □ Profit   □ Non-Profit 
 
6.  Type of guarantee: 
_1. Direct Guarantee to Banks 
_2. Counter-Guarantee to Mutual Guarantee Institutions 
_3. Co-guarantee with Mutual Guarantee Institutions 




7.  Tax Regime 
□ Taxable 
□ Tax Exempt 
 
8.  Responsibilities (Please check all that apply): 
 
  Funding  Ownership  Management  Credit Risk 
Assessment 
Monitoring  Recovery 
Government Agency          
Financial Institution          
Central Bank          
Banking Supervisor          
Private Company          
NGOs          
Multilateral Agency          
Other:          
Other:          
   
 
  30Panel B: Operational Characteristics 
 
9.  Eligibility (please check all that apply): 
□ Restricted by borrower size 
□ Small:     Number of employees: ________ or level of sales: ________ (currency: 
_____) 
□ Medium: Number of employees: ________ or level of sales: ________ (currency: 
_____) 
□ Large:     Number of employees: ________ or level of sales: ________ (currency: 
_____) 
□ Restricted to: □ new business   □ existing businesses 
□ Restricted to specific sector: ______________ 
□ Restricted by geographic area: ______________ 
□ Restricted to investment (i.e. capital formation) 




10.  Are guarantees used to foster any specific economic policies (i.e. to promote loans to women 
  or minority populations)?  □ Yes   □ No.  
 
If yes, please specify: ______________________________________ 
 
11.  Guarantee limit: □Yes □ No. If yes, please specify: 
□ Maximum:  In national currency: _____________ or percentage of the loan amount: _____% 
□ Minimum:   In national currency: _____________ or percentage of the loan amount: ______% 
 
12.  Maximum guarantee period (in years):____________________ 
 
13.  Guarantee coverage: 
_1. Principal; Please specify coverage ratio: ______% 
_2. Interest 
_3. Other costs 
 
14.  Operational Mechanism:  





                                                





Other:  _________________________________ 
 
15.  Provide training and guidance?  
To the Lender      □ Yes   □ No 
To the Borrower  □ Yes   □ No 
 
16.  Pricing structure (please check all that apply): 
□ Annual fee: □Yes □ No 
□ Membership fees: □Yes □ No 
□ Per loan fee: □Yes □ No 
 
11  Guarantees extended on a case-by-case basis by the guarantor. 
12  When accredited lenders are entitled to attach guarantees to loans within an eligible category without 
previous consultation of   
    the guarantor. 
13  Combination of loan basis and portfolio mechanisms. 
  31  If yes, based in (check all that apply): 
_1. Size of the loan   
_2. Amount guaranteed 
_3. Fee adapted to risk 
_4. Maturity 
Please specify fee: ____% 
Payment: □ in advance, □ quarterly, □ others: ______________ 
 
□ Application fee: □Yes □ No. If yes, please specify amount:__________ 
□ No fees 
 
Are fees paid by (please check all that applies): 
□ Financial Institution 
□ Borrower 
 
17.  Are additional penalty rates applicable in case of default in the payment?  □Yes □ No. 
 If yes, please specify rate: ___________________ 
 
18.  Does success in the repayment of loans lower the price of future guarantees?  □Yes □ No 
 
19.  Time of payout:  
_1. At time of default 
_2. After bank initiates recovery 
_3. After PCG initiates recovery 
_4. After the bank writes off the loan 
 
20.  Do borrowers need to provide collateral? □Yes □ No 
If yes, is there a minimum collateral value? □Yes  _______  □ No 
 
21.  If a loan is rejected by the PCG is a bank more likely to reject the loan or offer the loan at 
  higher rate/ greater collateral?  □Yes □ No 
            
  Estimated percentage of borrowers that would not have been able to receive a loan with out 
 a  guarantee:    _____________% 
 
22.  Information requirements: 
What kind of loan documentation are financial institutions required to provide?  
Please, specify: _____________________________________________________________ 
What is the estimated cost (in basis points) of these reporting requirements?  
Please, specify:______________________________________________________________ 
 
23.  Risk management: 
  Does the PCG use any risk management tools to mange their risk? 
_1. (Re)Insurance 
_2. Portfolio securitizations 
_3. None 
 
□ Other ____________________________ 
 
24.  What is the PCG’s total operating budget in 2006
14?  ________ (currency ____) 
 
  What is the contribution of government/public funding?  ________ (currency ____) 
 
                                                 
14  Or most recent available year. 
  32Panel C: Monitoring  
 
25.  Please, provide data for
15: 
 





Number of loans guaranteed    
Number of guarantee requests denied     
Average value of guarantees    
Number of default loans    
Average default amount    
Total amount of loan guarantees    
Total amount paid-out to lenders    
Number of loans that required pay-outs    
Currency:  
Businesses assisted 
Total number of businesses    
Number of new Jobs created    
Number of new business created    
Number of new Jobs created    
Business assisted per size 
Micro enterprises    
Small    
Medium    
Large    
Business assisted by sector 
Manufacturing    
Services    
Agriculture    
Construction    
 
                                                 
15  If available, please specify in US$. 
16  Since the creation of the PCG. 
17  Or most recent available year. 
  33Appendix 3:  Surveyed PCG Funds 
 
Country Fund 
Argentina Afianzar  S.G.R 
Argentina Agroaval  S.G.R 
Argentina FO.GA.BA.    S.A.P.E.M. 
Argentina Garantizar  Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca 
Argentina Intergarantias  Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca 
Bahamas  Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund 
Belgium Sowalfin 
Brazil  Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service 
Brazil  Fundo de Garantia para a Promocao da Competitivida 
Canada  Canada Small Business Financing Program 
Chile  Fondo de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios 
Colombia  Fondo Agropecuario de Garantías FAG 
Colombia  Fondo Nacional de Garantías 
Colombia  Fondo Regional de Garantías del Tolima S.A 
Costa Rica  FODEMIPYME 
Croatia  Croatian Agency for Small Businesses 
Egypt Credit  Guarantee Company 
El Salvador  Sociedad de Garantías Reciprocas 
Estonia Credit  and  Export  Guarantee Fund KreDex 
France Ose  Garantie 
France SIAGI 
Greece  Tempte SA (Credit Guarantee Fund of Small and very small Enterprises) 
Honduras  Fondo de Garantía del Programa de Financiamiento para el Sector Rural en 
Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria Fonga Finsa 
Hungary Hitelgarancia Zrt 
Hungary  Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation  (AVHGA) 
India  Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Small Induestries (CGTSI 
Israel  ISMEA, Israel SMEs Authorities 
Italy SFGA  Srl. 
Italy  Artigiancredit Toscano Societa cooperativa 
Italy CONFIDI    (FEDERASCOMFIDI) 
Italy CONFIDI  Veneziano Soc. Cooperativa 
Italy Federdifi  Lobarda  SC 
Italy SGFA  Srl 
Italy UNIONFIDI  S.C 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  Kibo Technology Fund 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  Korea Credit Guarantee Fund 
Lithuania  SME Guarantee Fund 
Luxembourg  Mutualité D'aide Aux artisans 
Luxembourg  Mutualité de Cautionnement et d'Aide aux Commerçants. S.c. 
Macau, China  Industrial and Commercial Development Fund 
Macedonia, FYR  Macedonian bank for Development promotion 
Malta  Malta Enterprise Corporation Loan Guarantee Scheme 
Mexico  Banco Nacional de Comercio exterior  SNC 
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18 Mexico Regional Average (All) 
Moldova  Interbank Guarantee Society GARANTIVEST 




FONAS de Solidarité Africaine 
Panama  Fondo de Garantías para la Micro y Pequeña Empresa 
Paraguay  Fondo de Garantía para las Micro, Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas 
Peru  Fundación Fondo de Garantía para Prestamos a la pequeña Industria FOGAPI 
Portugal  AGROGARANTE  - Mutual Guarantee Society (Agrogarante) 
Portugal  GARVAL - Mutual Guarantee Society (Garval) 
Portugal  LISGARANTE - Mutual Guarantee Society (LISAGARANTE) 
Portugal Mutual  Counter  Guarantee Fund (MCGF) 
Portugal  NORGARANTE - Mutual Guarantee Society 
Romania  National Loan Guarantee Fund for SMEs - FNGCIMM S.A. 
Romania Romanian  Loan  Guarantee  Fund for Private Entrepeneurs 
Romania  Rural Credit Guarantee Fund NFI 
Slovak Republic  Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank 
Spain  ISBA Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca 
Spain SGR 
Spain  Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca 
Spain Transaval  S.G.R 
Sri Lanka  Credit Guarantee Schemes of the Regional development Department of the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
Sweden ALMI  Foretagspartner  AB 
Switzerland  CSC Centrale Suisse de Cautionnement 
Taiwan, China  Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund of Taiwan (Taiwan 
SMEG) 
Thailand  Small Business Credit Guarantee Corporation (SBCG) 
Turkey Kedi  Garanti  Fonu (Credit Guarantee Fund) 
United Kingdom  Small Firm Loan Guarantee 
United States  US Small Business Administration 
Uruguay  Banco de La Republica Oriental de Uruguay 
Uruguay  FOGAR. Fondo Nacional Cooperativo de Garantías 
Uruguay  Fondo de Garantía 
Uruguay  Fondo de REC Laboral 
Venezuela  SGR Sogarsa Sociedad de Garantías Reciprocas para el Sector Agropecuario, 
Forestal, Pesquero y Afines S.A 
 
                                                 
18 This is the average of 38 regional PCG funds. 
19 Provides guarantees to banks within the West African monetary union. 